Portland State University

PDXScholar
Criminology and Criminal Justice Faculty
Publications and Presentations

Criminology and Criminal Justice

9-2013

“Fixed” Sentencing: The Effect on Imprisonment
Rates Over Time
Mark G. Harmon
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/ccj_fac
Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Citation Details
Harmon, Mark G., "“Fixed” Sentencing: The Effect on Imprisonment Rates Over Time" (2013). Criminology
and Criminal Justice Faculty Publications and Presentations. 15.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/ccj_fac/15

This Post-Print is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Criminology and
Criminal Justice Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please
contact us if we can make this document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

“FIXED” SENTENCING: THE EFFECT
ON IMPRISONMENT RATES OVER TIME
Abstract
Objective: Sentencing guidelines, statutory presumptive sentencing, determinate sentencing, truth in
sentencing, and three strikes are important components of the criminal justice system. The main
purpose behind a relatively-fixed sentence is to remove judicial discretion by insuring that convicted
felons receive a reasonably-assumed sentence depending on the crime committed. The current study
assessed shifts in year-to-year changes in incarceration rates within all 50 states from the years 1965 to
2008 due to the adoption of sentencing reforms.

Methods: The study tests two competing theories, a normative theory and critical theory of the expected
effects of reforms on imprisonment. Data was analyzed using panel regression with unit-specific fixed
effects, conditional change scores, panel corrected standard errors, and a new measure of reforms.

Results: This study, possibly due to differences in model specification, ran counter to a number of
previous studies and suggests some "front-end" sentencing reforms and "back-end" release changes are,
on average, related to changes in imprisonment.

Conclusions: The study concluded, that when significant, reforms increased more than decreased prison
growth in comparison to indeterminate sentencing. Additionally, the analysis concludes that changes in
release mechanisms and parole decision structures are driving increased growth more than changes in
sentencing structures.

Introduction
Prior to the 1970s, indeterminate sentencing dominated the United States criminal justice system.
This model of justice focused on rehabilitating offenders within prison through work and education
programs (Roberts, 1996). In most cases, judges (and in some jurisdictions the jury) were given wide
discretion to facilitate the rehabilitation process through sentencing offenders to loose ranges (e.g., 5 to
25 years). Parole boards, acting independently of other parts of the judicial system and largely
independent of legislators, then determined if the prisoner had been properly rehabilitated and ready for
release. The sentencing model reflected a criminal-centered approach designed to pattern punishment to
the offender’s rehabilitation needs. But in the late 1960s and early 1970s, critics, including politicians,
criminal justice practitioners, social science researchers, and the media advanced a number of purported
problems, including complaints about the arbitrary nature of the sentencing procedure, ineffectiveness of
treatment and reform programs, cozy correctional facilities, and rampant repeat offenders (Blumstein,
Cohen, Martin, & Tonry, 1983; Reitz, 1995, 1996).
Beginning in the early 1970s, imprisonment began an unprecedented climb that resulted in an
almost continual five-fold increase over the last 40 or so years. At the same time that imprisonment was
rising, a shift in our criminal justice policies occurred reflecting what was often labeled the “get tough
on crime” or “law and order” movement. The origins of the movement are often linked to the decade of
the 1960s when increased urban unrest resulted in riots, radical youth and black power movements,
assassinations of top political figures, and increased crime rates (Beckett, 1997; LaFree, 1998; O'Brien,
2003). These factors interacted with and were enhanced by media coverage (Scheingold, 1991), public
concerns (Warr, 1995), and the political responses to these problems. In a sense, these interactions
created a perfect storm that fostered the law and order movement, which called for increased focus on
crime and a demand for more punitive sanctions. In response, the federal government formed the
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in 1969 and passed
legislation establishing the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration – the LEAA – (part of the
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Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968). The LEAA provided funds to law enforcement
agencies to professionalize their operations and improve their record keeping.
Corresponding to the law and order movement was a rise in crime that began during the 1980s
and ran through the early 90s before it fell again. The growing concern with crime as a social problem
helped generate concerns about the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. The amount of
discretion at all levels of the justice system, concerns that some offenders were not receiving stiff
enough sentences or were being released too soon, and general issues of fairness for victims and
offenders in the criminal justice system were all important issues that took on a new salience during this
period (Smith, 2004).
Critics that focused on sentencing structures charged that it allowed far too much disparity in
sentencing types and time served. In response, legislators and/or voters passed discretion-limiting
sentencing reforms with more pre-determined structures that generally narrowed the sentencing ranges
and the ability of officials to deviate from them (Frase, 2005; Stemen, Rengifo, & Wilson, 2006; Tonry,
2009). While some scholars have pointed to increased imprisonment as a result of sentencing reforms,
others have suggested the opposite, indicating no additional increase or even a reduction in growth
(Stemen, et al., 2006), producing a canon of prior research that is inconsistent with contradictory results.
For example, a recent study by Zhang et al. (2009) using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to test a
weberian formal rationality theory found that reforms did not account for increases in imprisonment.
While their analysis is similar to this study they incorporated a substantially different modeling
technique and control variables. Most notably HLM does not account for trending data and possible
unit-specific omitted variable bias, two areas that must be addressed (a point this paper will later argue).
Zhang, et als. (2009) analysis largely contradicted their predicted outcomes that reforms due to increased
predetermined predictable outcomes focused on classes of crime would increase imprisonment.
Conversely, D'Alessio and Stolzenberg (1995), using time-series data to assess changes over time, found
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jail populations in Minnesota rose after the passage of sentencing guidelines, but that the effect was
mitigated when judges took prison-crowding into account.
Stemen et al. (2006) produced a number of competing results. For example, they found that the
combination of determinate sentencing and voluntary sentencing guidelines increased imprisonment at
the state level, while those states with a combination of determinate sentencing and presumptive
sentencing guidelines had lower imprisonment rates (though neither reform was significantly related).
The study by Stemen et al. (2006) is the closest study methodologically to this study. Their analysis
used a very similar panel structure, though their analysis includes a number of divergent components,
most notably the choice to include fixed effects for time and not for states and their choice to use data in
three-year increments. The consideration of fixed-effects is one of the chief specification decisions in
panel modeling (Halaby, 2004) and failure to properly specify them can undermine an analysis. The
analysis in the present study included fixed effects for states and is one of a number of specifications
divergent from the majority of prior research. It is argued in this analysis that the models included are
more methodologically sound and more appropriate from a theoretical stance.
The model specifications in this study also included a conditional change-score dependent
variable (measured as percent change over time) measured through a three-year moving average. When
modeled together with fixed effects for states, the conditional change-score model resulted in
measurements of the average change over-time in imprisonment within states controlling for other statelevel time-variant covariates. In an additional divergence from previous research, this analysis
incorporated a new measure of reforms as logged growth curves that are more theoretically appropriate.
The model represents a significant divergence from previous research and should supply more robust
and theoretically appropriate results (Halaby, 2004; Spelman, 2008).
Table 1 About Here
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This study focused on six sentencing reforms passed after 1972, which included sentencing
guidelines (divided into presumptive and voluntary); statutory presumptive sentencing; truth in
sentencing; determinate sentencing (abolishment of discretionary parole boards); and three strikes laws.
These reforms are outlined in Table 1 and it indicates they that now comprise the majority of sentencing
structures in the US. The study utilizes two competing theories to hypothesis expected effects. The
first, a neo-classical theory, was drawn from critical theories suggesting that the context of the law and
order movement and the increased bureaucratization of the justice system combined to fuel passage of
reforms that were more punitive and led to higher imprisonment. The second theory was drawn from
normative explanations that suggest reforms created a structure that was more responsive in managing
prison growth and therefore lower changes in imprisonment would be expected under reforms.
Literature Review
The majority of previous sentencing reform research, with notable exceptions, falls largely into
two broad categories. The first focuses on extra-legal effects such as the influence of race or gender on
judicial departures from baseline sentence recommendations (e.g. Johnson, 2006; Kramer &
Steffensmeier, 1993; Kramer & Ulmer, 1996; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998; Ulmer & Kramer,
1998; Wooldredge, 2009; Wooldredge & Griffin, 2005; Wooldredge, Griffin, & Rauschenberg, 2005),
while the second focuses on the influence of policy changes on sentencing outcomes (e.g. Arvanites &
Asher, 1998; Brewer, Beckett, & Holt, 1981; D'Alessio & Stolzenberg, 1995; Frase, 1995, 2005; Griset,
1996; Johnson, 2006; Tonry, 1995a, 1995b). In both cases the body of literature largely utilized data on
individual states, counties, or cities. While providing important insights, they are limited to the specific
context and sentencing structures of the particular jurisdiction and lack broad cross-sectional
applicability. Additionally, the majority lacked a time dimension that restricted their ability to draw
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inferences regarding change over time. While a few studies analyzed year-to-year changes over time,
these studies were largely limited to a single state, calling into question their generalizability.1
This paper follows a smaller subset of research that analyzed aggregate state level data over time
(e.g., Marvell (1995), Nicholson-Crotty (2004), Stemen et al. (2006), Spelman (2009), and Zhang et. al.
(2009). The results of these similar “pooled” studies, where cross-sections in the form of states are
observed over time as a time series generally, though not universally, suggested reforms specifically
targeted at sentencing (e.g., sentencing guidelines and statutory presumptive sentencing) did not directly
lead to increased imprisonment. In some cases the studies suggested reforms actually reduced changes
in imprisonment. The studies further suggested that the elimination of discretionary parole release (e.g.,
determinate sentencing) and the adoption of truth in sentencing were more likely to be associated, but
the findings were mixed suggesting both increases and decreases. Similar to some of the findings of
Stemen et al. (2006), Marvell (1995) found in his study of nine presumptive sentencing guideline states
that prison growth slowed when prison capacity was specifically taken into consideration. While this
was a comprehensive study covering 1974 to 1990, Marvell’s study possessed some limitations,
including analysis restricted to nine presumptive guideline states, thus leaving the analysis absent of
comparison of non-reform states to formulate conclusions in comparison.
Spelman (2009), Stemen et al. (2006), and Zhang et al.’s (2009) studies are the most similar to
this study, analyzing similar reforms with “pooled” data from all 50 states over relatively long periods of
time. As previously stated, analysis by both Stemen and colleagues (2006) and Zhang and colleagues
(2009) produced rather mixed results and generally indicated that reforms more often reduced, rather
than increased, imprisonment. Conversely, Spelman (2009), found that truth in sentencing laws,
especially those passed after the 1994 omnibus crime bill, were an important component that explained
part of the rise in state imprisonment. Spelman (2009) suggested that truth-in-sentencing resulted in a

1

Preliminary analysis in this study indicated that considerable state-to-state variation existed in imprisonment rates, which further calls into
question the generalizability of the single-state approach.
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13% increase in state imprisonment. While he contends that this reform is more of a reflection of the
funds made available through the crime bill and was part of a larger pattern of state revenues driving
imprisonment (e.g. if money exists to increase capacity, a state generally does and will convict criminals
to fill that capacity), a significant, positive effect of truth-in-sentencing was existent. As Spelman
(2008) suggested in a separate article, the contradictory findings of effects on imprisonment may be a
product of differential model specification. Specifically, he notes the need to first difference
imprisonment data, as the failure to do so can result in spurious findings that misrepresent actual effects
of covariates.
Neo-classical Explanations of Reform Impact on Imprisonment
Blumstein et al. (1983) suggest several reasons for the sentencing reform movement, including
prison uprisings (raising questions about rehabilitation), concern about individual rights and the control
of discretion, demand for accountability, disillusionment with rehabilitation, disparity and
discrimination in sentencing and parole, and crime control. As noted in their study (Blumstein, et al.,
1983: 3): “These factors, among others, coalesced into a compelling case against indeterminate
sentencing. The indeterminate sentencing system that was all but universally supported in the 1950s had
few defenders by the late 1970s.” Some scholars suggested that intense public pressure to “do
something” aided in the passage of the 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill, which made money available for,
among other things, sentencing reforms (Blumstein & Beck, 1999).
While previous research has produced mixed findings, a number of studies (e.g. Engen &
Gainey, 2000; Engen, Gainey, Crutchfield, & Weis, 2003; Savelsberg, 1992; Zhang, et al., 2009) have
incorporated a similar neoclassical Weberian theory that highlights the reallocation of discretion and
power within the bureaucratic structures of sentencing. Savelsberg (1992), for example, argued that
sentencing guidelines (and likely other sentencing reforms as well) are an ideal representation of
Weber’s formal rationality, which creates a distinctive theoretical lens for understanding how sentencing
policy was “fixed” or, in other words, how the structure was altered to become more predetermined with
7

less discretion. This theory suggests that sentencing reforms represent formal rationality, while
indeterminate sentencing is more closely aligned with substantive rationality. Both sentencing
procedures are rational as defined by Weber (1978) because they are based in law and thus have
“legalized” validity, but differ in their application (i.e. formal vs. substantive) of the laws. Substantive
decision-making is subject to values, appeals to ethical norms, and historical precedent with less focus
on uniformity of the outcomes. Formal decisions, on the other hand, focus on limiting subjective
decision-making by stressing rationalized, structural outcomes that remove personal values by
emphasizing a technical orientation to procedural process grounded in well-defined criteria designed to
elicit a specific outcome. "The judge . . . is more or less an automaton of paragraphs: the legal
documents, together with the costs and fees, are dropped in at the top with the expectation that the
judgment will emerge at the bottom, together with more or less sound arguments - an apparatus,
accordingly, whose functioning is by and large calculable or predictable” (Weber 1978: 17). In the end,
social policies such as “fixed” sentencing reforms serve to bureaucratize the process, with the specific
goal of removing subjective interpretations and outcomes (Engen & Gainey, 2000; Zhang, et al., 2009).
Scheingold (1991) and Beckett (1997), for example, suggested shifts in sentencing policy represented
the concerted effort by policy makers to advance the “justice model” of crime and punishment. This
framework focuses on making criminals pay and deterring those who might commit crimes in the
future,2 with punishment tailored to fit the crime rather than the offender. This more critical theory
suggests reforms representing broader social pressures of the law and order movement resulting in a
push for more punitive sanctions whereas reforms served as a tool to codify law and order within
sentencing.
To understand how increased imprisonment might be connected to sentencing policy impacted
by the law and order movement, Scheingold (1991) suggests we must recognize the complex and
2
Some authors like Von Hirsch (1985) would argue that reforms do not represent such a cynical approach, but instead take a more
measured, “proportional” structure designed to meet the crime and take on no real deterrence effect (or at least are not explicitly designed
to be a deterrent). Authors who advocate a Von Hirsch view of reforms often refer to them as a proportional model.
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interactive mechanisms that shape policy change. The interaction includes policy makers at national,
state, and local levels, political elites, public opinion, citizen activism, and media responses and
representations. A crucial element of this interaction is the public’s fear of crime. “[P]olicy changes are
mostly likely to occur when political leaders, in part by taking their cues from the media, choose to play
upon public anxieties that are themselves inflamed by media imagery and vicarious victimization rather
than by crime as such” (Scheingold 1991:44). Gottschalk (2006, 2009) notes that prior to the late 1960s,
crime rarely registered as a top public issue and not until the law and order movement did the public
begin to demand substantial change. Accustomed to further political agendas by playing on public fears
of crime (often misrepresenting actual crime rates), politicians advanced an individualistic view of crime
as a function of societal deviants. A lack of effective sanctions was seen as part of the problem
(Abramsky, 2007; Simon, 2007). Meanwhile, the media continually displayed images of crime,
especially images of isolated victims of random violent crime, fueling public fears (Glassner, 1999). In
completing the interactive cycle, politicians then seized upon these fears to create platforms focused on
getting tough on crime. This complex circle of interactions served to promote and sustain the
politicization of crime characterized by the “politics of fear” that stressed “getting tough on crime,”
resulting in the model of punishment, featuring, among other things, “fixed” sentencing reforms
(Beckett, 1997; Simon, 2007).
These historical underpinnings provide some important contexts when considering why reforms
were passed and what goals they may have had, but unless reforms were significant in altering the
structure, shifts in imprisonment are not likely. For example, if judicial discretion is maintained, then
reforms are unlikely to effect change (Doob, 2000; Simon, 2007). If the historical underpinnings are
successful in a structural changes (e.g. Weberian formal rationality) that codify the law and order
movement then it may be possible that reforms resulted in an increase in imprisonment (Engen &
Gainey, 2000; Savelsberg, 1992). Thus while reforms often had a stated goal of considering impacts on
imprisonment, the goal of not increasing it could have been overcome by broader “get tough” demands.
9

Thus, the first hypothesized outcome of this study suggests increased focus on formal rational outcomes
in sentencing combined with the law and order movement to increase imprisonment in sentencing
reform states more than non-reform states.
Normative Theories of Sentencing Growth and Reforms
Prior research has differed in the theorized outcome of changes to the bureaucratic structure of
sentencing. Some research suggested that increased control and more pre-defined sentencing allowed
officials (e.g. sentencing commissions, prison officials, or legislators) to better manage prison growth.
These authors tended to draw from normative theories that suggest prison growth was the result of other
factors like increased criminal activity, spikes in violent crime among young people, or increased social
and/or economic instabilities (Von Hirsch, 1985). They then suggested, through highlighting the stated
goals of reforms and the general points of emphases within the sentencing system, that reforms were not
one of the factors that increased imprisonment. Zimring (2001) suggested that sentencing reforms were
not associated with prison growth directly, highlighting that several of the reforms had the stated goal of
considering impacts on imprisonment during their construction. Tonry (1997) showed that after
Minnesota instituted sentencing guidelines in 1980 their prison population did rise, but at lower rates
than the national average and that by 1992, Minnesota had the second lowest rate of imprisonment in the
country.
The normative theory that posits sentencing reforms may reduce imprisonment by creating a
structure more responsive to external pressures highlights the strain of the contradictions the criminal
justice system experienced during the law and order movement. While many politicians and a large
portion of the general public began to demand increased awareness of and effective curbing of crime the
justice system was often not prepared to respond. Criminal justice officials, especially judges were
often resentful of the new approaches and prisons, which were often at or over capacity and lacked the
resources to handle more inmates. The tension often resulted in a demand to address the “problem of
crime” while not explicitly increasing imprisonment (Engen & Steen, 2000; Tonry & Hatlestad, 1997).
10

Marvel (1995) found that when states were explicitly directed to consider the impact of presumptive
sentencing guidelines on imprisonment that they either maintained or, in some cases, reduced
imprisonment. As Marvel suggests it is possible that policy makers decided moderation was necessary
to slow growth, as legislators were reluctant to fund the construction of additional prisons.
It is possible sentencing commissions were insolated from the larger demands of the law and
order movement and even though politicians and the public may have demanded more prison sentences
and more time-served, commissions were able to operate behind the public scrutiny and use the new
power over sentencing policies to effectively curb growth. The supporters of the normative theory of
reforms suggest the same Weberian formal rationalization process are taking place, but they suggest the
process was not necessarily influenced by the “get tough” calls of the law and order movement. The
postulate is bolstered by evidence that states with active commissions were often explicitly told that
prison growth must be considered when altering sentencing and were less likely to see prison growth
(Marvell, 1995; U.S., 1996; Zhang, et al., 2009; Zimring, 2001).
Hypotheses
This paper used differentiated modeling techniques from previous research to test two competing
hypotheses. If the analysis assumes that “fixed” sentencing reforms represented a structural change born
under the politics of fear associated with the law and order movement, it is possible that the interaction
served to increase imprisonment in states with the sentencing reforms at a greater rate than in states with
indeterminate sentencing. Though states not adopting “fixed” sentencing are also likely to be influenced
by the sociopolitics of the time, “fixed” reforms are likely to increase imprisonment more by formalizing
the sociopolitical environment into practice through their technical-rational bureaucratic structure
brought on by their formal rationalization. For example, by limiting the low end of the sentence range,
the judge has restricted ability to select lenient sentences for at least some felons (Johnson, Ulmer, &
Kramer, 2008; Savelsberg, 1992). If the analysis follows the normative theories, where reforms served
as a way to control spiraling imprisonment caused by other factors, we would expect that sentencing
11

reforms reduced changes in imprisonment more than that of non-reform states (Greenberg & West,
2001; Marvell, 1995; Tonry & Hatlestad, 1997).
Specifically, it was expected that the adoption of presumptive sentencing guidelines, voluntary
sentencing guidelines, statutory presumptive sentencing, truth in sentencing, and determinant sentencing
would be associated with imprisonment. The effects of the adoption of three strikes legislation was also
analyzed – but an association was less assured. The hesitation in making a prediction in the case of
three strikes is related to a number of prior studies indicating that because relatively few criminals,
outside of California, Florida, and Georgia were sentenced under the law, it has had little actual
substantive impact (Dickey & Hollenhorst, 1999; Kovandzic, Sloan, & Vieraitis, 2004). For example,
Dickey and Hollenhorst (1999) found that fewer than a hundred inmates were sentenced under three
strikes. Additionally, these hypotheses are drawn from theories specific to the U.S. justice system. As
Von Hirsch (1985) has pointed out, while many western industrial societies also experienced substantial
prison growth, the U.S. maintains a unique system-both structurally and culturally-suggesting the effects
are not generalizable to other countries.
Data
Dependent Variable
Before 1972, imprisonment rates remained relatively stable over time, but since that year, steady
and rapid increases occurred. To measure possible impacts of sentencing reforms on imprisonment the
analysis incorporates a dependent variable of total prison population per 100,000. The variable was
measured on the state level (all 503 states) and was observed over time from 1967 to 20074, resulting in
2050 possible observations. This “pooling” of the time-series and cross-sectional data greatly improves
the statistical power of the models (Hsiao, 2003; Wooldridge, 1997).
3
Washington, D.C. is often included in analysis of this type (treated as a “fifty-first state”), but was excluded because data for the entire
time period in question was not complete. In addition to incomplete data, Washington, D.C. stopped housing its own prisoners in 2001.
4

Data actually covers the years 1965 to 2008, but the moving average truncated the data by one year at the beginning and the end.
Furthermore, the lagged variables further reduced the measured effects, reducing the actual measured years from 1967 to 2007.
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A Dickey Fuller test (𝑍 𝑡 = −1.656)  suggested the presence of a unit-root in the unchanged
dependent variable. Furthermore, when the dependent variable was measured as a rate of total
imprisonment, there are substantive reasons to believe that a previous year’s imprisonment is highly
associated with the current year’s level. Furthermore previous research has indicated that imprisonment
is unit-root at the state-level (Spelman, 2008). Because of the presence of a unit root, the dependent
variable was transformed into percent change (Δ𝑌 = ((𝑌!" /𝑌!"!! ) − 1) ∗ 100), changing the dependent
variable to year-to-year change (sometimes referred to as the unconditional change-score, where the
score was measured as a percentage) in imprisonment (Finkel, 1995; Halaby, 2004).
Between the years of 1967 and 2007 imprisonment trended up almost 550%. This created the
common time-series specification problem where reforms would likely increase total imprisonment
simply because they are clustered on the more recent end of the time-series where the rate of
imprisonment is the highest. This is a specification error that must be corrected; fortunately, the firstdifference transformation also corrects for this problem. Unlike the unchanged-score model, the
change-score model no longer fails the Dickey Fuller test (𝑍 𝑡 = −6.382, 𝑃 < .01).5
Even in a change-score analysis a shock or spike in the series can undermine the ability of the
model to effectively measure change over time. To remedy the apparent shocks observed, a three-year
moving average was instituted (Frees, 2004). This helped to alleviate strain on the model and resulted in
about a ¼ reduction in standard errors and about a 10% increase in R-squared even after the reduction of
100 observations. Thus to facilitate analysis state imprisonment rates were transformed into a
percentage change per year and then into a three-year moving average. This allowed for assessment of
state-level changes in imprisonment rates over time due to changes in state-level covariates. Data for

5

This is true for both the first differenced and moving averaged variables.
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the dependent variable was obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (U.S., 1965-1983, 1984-1998,
1999-2008)6
Sentencing Reform Variables
Table 2 outlines the six sentencing reform variables. They were compiled from three sources
which included a report from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (1996), an article by Zhang, Maxwell,
and Vaughn (2009), and a report by the Vera Institute (Stemen, et al., 2006). While most research is in
agreement on the general aim of the various reforms, considerable variation in the design and
application exists and there is little consensus on appropriate grouping (Frase, 2005; Marvell, 1995;
Stemen, 2007; Tonry, 1995b). This study takes an approach common among the researchers who
focused on important legal distinctions among the reforms (distinctions are discussed below).
In a shift away from indeterminate sentencing, sentencing guidelines consist of a matrix of
possible sentences with a more narrow range within sentencing categories that are defined by an
offender’s criminal history (prior offenses) and offense severity. These two main determinates make up
the technical apparatus informing the judge’s “automation of paragraphs” suggested by Weber (1978).
It is important to note that the design and implementation of guidelines vary considerably from state-tostate (Frase, 2005; Stemen, et al., 2006). One classification of guidelines incorporates two loose legal
categories. The first, labeled presumptive sentencing guidelines, are “legally binding” where a judge’s
decision is regulated through appellate review. The second format, voluntary sentencing guidelines,
treats guidelines as a formal recommendation, but does not legally mandate that they be followed, as
they are not enforced through appellate review. While judges may be required to give a written
justification to deviate, they are not legally obligated to follow them and are largely free to render any
decision they want (Stemen, et al., 2006). Research does substantiate judges follow the
6
Data for the years of 1972 to 1983 is available in the yearly publication: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1972
(through 1983). Data for the years of 1984 to 1998 is available in the yearly publication: Correctional Populations in the United States,
1984 (through 1998). Data for the years of 1999 to 2008 is available in the yearly publication: Prisoners, 1999 (through 2008). Rates per
100,000 for each variable was computed by taking the raw number of prisoners for each state by year that was provided by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics and dividing by state population per 100,000 as supplied by the Bureau of the Census.
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recommendations of voluntary guidelines 85% of the time, suggesting they do have an impact (Miethe
& Moore, 1988). The bifurcated classification7 of presumptive or voluntary is unrelated to how the
guidelines were created (by legislative statute, initiative process, or sentencing commission) or whether
an active commission monitors them.
Table 2 About Here

It is important to note that while it is relatively simple to classify guidelines by their binding
legal status, considerable variation exists in design and application, both across and within the two types
(Frase, 1995, 2005; Reitz, 1995).8 As Frase (2005) and Tonry (1995b) argue it may be more appropriate
to consider guidelines as falling on a continuum from structured to loose. Many states, like
Pennsylvania, while they are legally classified as a presumptive guideline state, have very wide
sentencing ranges acting in many ways like a voluntary guideline. Some voluntary systems, as in
Missouri, have very limited ranges, giving little leeway to judges who choose to follow them. Many
researchers have rightfully acknowledged the “fixedness” of sentencing guidelines varies considerably
from state-to-state. Because explanation of the general effects is the primary objective and not the
variation within guidelines, the author has chosen to leave further discussion of guidelines diversity to
another analysis.

7

A census of the appropriateness of this bifurcation is not uniformly agreed upon and considerable disagreement of the proper way to
categorize them still exists. The two “types” discussed here represent a division largely discussed and advocated by Frase (1995) and
Stemen et al. (2006) and is the most likely division to be informative in this analysis.
8

Furthermore, the factors considered during initial adoption varied greatly. For example, stated attempts to be prison growth neutral,
designed to be proscriptive vs. prescriptive, and explicit consideration of one or more of the following issues: race, ethnicity, and gender.
These state-to-state variations in “design factors” will not be directly assessed in this study, but do represent an area of analysis worthy of
investigation. They are not directly assessed in this study for three reasons. First, the analysis is concerned with aggregate data and any
further slicing of the independent variables further reduces the predictive power of the analysis. Second, theoretically it is likely that while
states have discussed publicly their desires, outcomes will likely vary considerably from their stated goals. Third, individual discussion of
isolated states’ sociopolitical landscape during adoption is hampered by a lack of available aggregated data.
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Statutory presumptive sentencing9 was also assessed. It was another attempt to shift away
from the indeterminate model. While statutory presumptive sentencing is similar to sentencing
guidelines, it is important not to lump them together, as statutory presumptive sentencing represents an
attempt to create uniformity within similarly situated crimes, but does not use a sentencing rubric. It
specifies an appropriate or "normal" sentence for each offense as a baseline. Other relevant factors
(aggravating or mitigating circumstances) may be considered alongside the baseline sentence, but its
intent is to “fit the punishment to the crime” rather than “fit the punishment to the offender” (Brewer, et
al., 1981; Frase, 1995; Savelsberg, 1992).
This study also assessed determinate sentencing (abolishment of parole) and truth in
sentencing laws. In contrast to the three previously mentioned reforms, their focus lies in the “backend” mechanism of release as opposed to the “front-end” of sentencing. Determinate sentencing10 is
used to refer to a system without discretionary parole boards. Truth in sentencing, on the other hand,
does not necessarily dictate the elimination of parole boards, but instead requires offenders to serve a
statutorily defined minimum amount of time. Only states that meet the 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill
minimum (85% time-served of the original sentence) are considered in this analysis. These reforms, like
the front-end reforms, shift the role of sentencing away from a more rehabilitative-indeterminate model.
Finally, three strikes laws, which suggest a severe sentence (e.g. 25 to life or a straight life sentence)
for a third felony offense, were considered. Due to their focus on habitual offenders, they are considered
an additional reform beyond the previous five more structured reforms. They, too, fall under the
umbrella of “fixed” reforms because they are designed to limit discretion through an apparent departure
from the rehabilitation model (Griset, 1995; Stemen, et al., 2006).

9

As with other sentencing reforms, considerable variation between states adopting statutory presumptive sentencing exists. For this
analysis, the important point is that this sentencing procedure again represents a shift from the indeterminate model to a model focused on
equalizing the variation in sentencing across similar crimes by “fixing” the sentence to the crime.
10

The choice of determinate sentencing to represent the elimination of discretionary parole boards is unfortunate and has often led to
confusion. The name choice was dictated by policy makers and not chosen by the author of this article. It was decided to leave the name
as determinate sentencing, as this is the term most commonly used in the literature.
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There are three key points about reforms that should be noted. First, the front-end reforms are
mutually exclusive and may not co-exist with each other or indeterminate sentencing. The back-end
reforms, if instituted, operate alongside whichever front-end sentencing structure the state employs and
may co-exist with each other. Second, because the dependent variable does not include county or local
jail populations, only individuals sentenced to more than one year are considered, suggesting a one-year
lag (the impact beginning one year after inception). Third, while in the year following the reform there
will be an instantaneous effect on some portion of the imprisonment rate, not all individuals in any given
year will be “caught up” by the reform. Some of the rate of imprisonment will be individuals who were
already imprisoned and sentenced under the previous sentencing procedure. Over time, a greater
proportion of prisoners will be “caught up” by the reform. At some point a plateau at nearly full effect
will occur and only a small portion of the rate of imprisonment will be individuals sentenced to long
terms under indeterminate sentencing. To address both the lagged effect and in order to capture the
expected “logged growth curve” like effect, a logarithmic measure of the reforms was instituted
(Harmon, 2011). This measure represents an important divergence from many previous analyses, which
relied heavily on dummy variables.11
To create the new measures, each state was coded as 1.00 in the first year of implementation and
as e (2.71828) for year five through the last year of observation. A period of five years was chosen as
the period to reach full effect because the average sentence was a little over two and a half years.12 The
intervening years between one and five were set at an equal distance between 1.00 and 2.71828. Finally,
the natural log of each score was taken. This procedure created a “logarithmic growth variable” with a
one-year lag (the log of 1 is 0) that suggests full effect at five years (ln of 2.71828 is 1). The measure
represents an effect that approaches 1 (the full effect) at an increasingly diminished rate (increased fast

11
Coding the reforms as dummy variables (zero before adoption and 1 after adoption) suggests imprisonment rates would be affected 100%
by the new policy in the first year it was adopted.
12

While the effects are likely to vary from state-to-state, the lack of specific knowledge of the effect in any given state necessitates a
general measure representing all reforms. That being said, this measure is likely an improvement over previous reforms.
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at first and then slowed).13 The state-by-year observations with indeterminate sentencing were coded to
zero and represented the reference group.
Control Variables
The control variables were grouped into three main areas of influence. The first area, crime
controls, was measures by arrests for violent crime14 and drug crime. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Report
(UCR) (1965-2008b) supplied the data and were then converted into state-specific rates using census
data (U.S. 1965-2008). The crime variables represented a theory that arrests had a direct effect on
changes in state imprisonment. Simply put, states with more crime had larger increases in imprisonment
over time. This theory necessitates that the crime variables be lagged, as crime rates are not likely to
have an “instantaneous” effect on imprisonment, as those arrested will undoubtedly take time to be
processed through the system. The variables were transformed into a percent change score (Δ𝑋 =
((𝑋!" /𝑋!"!! ) − 1) ∗ 100) to avoid any issues due to trends in arrests. The models could have included
un-lagged crime controls, but this would suggest a “simultaneous” effect. While possible, for example,
if higher crime created social pressure to “do something about it”, it was less likely (DeFina &
Arvanites, 2002).
The second group of controls included five demographic variables. The U.S. Census (19652008)15 supplied data for percent Black, percent Hispanic, and percent urban, and also supplied state
population which was used to construct all rate variables. While percent urban was also transformed
into a percent change score in the same way that the arrest variables were, percent Black and percent
Hispanic were not. While percent urban trended up over time necessitating the transformation into
13

The models were run using two different measures of reforms not presented in this paper to assess the robustness of the “growth-like
effect” of reforms. The first used dummy codes to represent reforms. These models had similar point estimates, but generally had
significantly inflated standard errors. The inflated errors make sense if the dummy variables are overestimating the effect of reforms in the
early years of adoption as argues in this paper. The second additional specification included non-limited variables that continued the
logarithmic increase over the entire life of the reform. The last specification again produced similar point estimates but had larger standard
errors. It should be noted that the non-limited variables version errors were not as large as the dummy variables suggesting that dummy
codes are the least appropriate measure.
14

Violent crime arrests represent UCR indexed crimes and include the offenses of murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

15

Data from the census was compiled from both census data and population estimates.
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percent change, percent Black and Hispanic16 were more stable within states (though they vary
considerably from state-to-state) and did not change considerably over time where high percent states
remained high while low percent states remained low. The last two demographic variables,
unemployment rate and percent under the poverty line-were supplied by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (1965-2008a) and U.S. Bureau of the Census (2006), respectively, and were also not
transformed, as they also did not trend substantially over time.
The third set of controls includes political variables. Dubin (2007) supplied the needed data for
political party affiliation of each state senate and house (or assembly).17 The dummy code for the
political party of the Governor of each state was obtained from Hershey (2007). The political variables
were also lagged in this analysis, suggesting that it takes at least two years for political control to impact
state operations. The final political variable, state revenue, was included because policy decisions are,
in part, influenced by resources (Spelman, 2009). Vera Institute (Stemen, 2007) supplied yearly data on
revenues. It was then converted into rates per 100,000 using census data, adjusted for inflation to 2008
U.S. dollars. State revenues represent all state dollars collected from taxes and other resources per year.
Research indicates that all three sets of controls represent key areas of association with imprisonment,
warranting their inclusion in this analysis (Barker, 2006; Beckett & Western, 2001; Blumstein & Beck,
1999; Parker & Horwitz, 1986; Raphael, 2009; Spelman, 2009).
Methods
To analyze changes in state imprisonment rates due to the adoption of sentencing reforms, a
Time-Series Cross-Section (TSCS) Regression technique utilizing Panel Corrected Standard Errors
(PCSE) was employed. In the standard panel specification, panel errors are prone to problems of

16

In an analysis not presented Percent Black and Percent Hispanic were logged resulting in slightly different results, but the substantive
finding remained the same.
17
State house and senate variables were constructed by centering the percent Republican around 50% so that Republican control represents
positive deviations from 50%, while Democratic control represents negative deviations. The absolute value of the deviations were then
logged, with the negative sign return for the Democratic control, to create a logarithmic scale with positive and negative deviation from
zero to represent the diminishing returns of political party concentrations (see Harmon 2011).
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heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. PCSE are helpful in alleviating these problems improving
reliability of the standard errors (Beck & Katz, 1995; Hsiao, 2003; Wooldridge, 1995).
While PCSE corrects some of the potential issues with the standard errors, it does not solve all
issues associated with the complicated analysis. Omitted state-level variables that are stable over time
and correlated with the error term of the dependent variable (omitted variable bias) can make point
estimates biased and, if present in the model (e.g. the random-effects model: 𝑌 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑋!!" … 𝛽!"# +
𝜐! + 𝜍! + 𝜀!" ),18 must be corrected. A Hausman test (𝜒 ! = 59.74, 𝑃 < .001) comparing a unit-fixedeffects model to a random-effects model suggested that omitted bias was present. Therefore, a unitfixed-effect model, which holds the unexplained time-invariant variation constant, controlling for the
unobserved state level effects, was incorporated through inclusion of 50-1 (e.g., ii ...ii −1 )19 dummy
variables for each state. While the unit (panel-specific) fixed-effects model is statistically necessary in
this analysis, it also sacrifices little in substantive interpretation because the primary concern is not with
panel-to-panel variation. Instead, the interest lies in aggregate change over time within states. In fact,
the panel-specific fixed-effects approach measures exactly that: the change in the dependent variable
within each panel where the coefficients give us the aggregate within-state change over time for the
average within-state change in the independent variables (England, Kilbourne, Farkas, & Dou, 1988;
Halaby, 2004; Wooldridge, 1997, 2005). Substantively, this was where the expected effect of reforms
that are state (panel) specific was located.
A second Hausman test comparing the unit-specific fixed effects model (with a change-scored
dependent variable as a three-year moving average) to the full fixed effects model (including both time
and unit fixed effects) suggested that the model was consistent under the unit-specific model.
Additionally, because theory suggests it is desirable to preserve the measure of change over time and

18

Where υ i is the unobserved time-invariant variation, 𝜍! is the unobserved case-invariant variation and ε it is the idiosyncratic error term.

ε it is assumed to be uncorrelated with X1it ...Xnit and with υi and 𝜍!   and where υ i and  𝜍!   are not correlated with
Because ii ...ii −1 and 𝛽!   are perfectly correlated with υ i , υ i drops from the analysis
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X1it ...Xnit .

that dummy variables for time would reduce efficiency and introduce multicolinearity, it was decided
not to include fixed-effects for years (Allison, 2009; Finkel, 1995; Halaby, 2004).
It is likely the unit-specific fixed effects model is more desirable given the results of the second
Hausman test, but a full fixed effects model with both time and unit fixed effects may still be justified.
If year-to-year changes that affect states equally is occurring such that it is causing significant enough
time-specific unit-invariant (e.g. a national effect) omitted variable bias than the consistency of the point
estimates could be undermined. In this situation the full fixed effects model would be necessary. While
a Hausman test gives some evidence to the contrary, running both models will give better insight into
any possible national effect. Thus a full fixed effects model that included 41-1 (e.g. 𝑡! … 𝑡!!! )20 dummy
variables for time in addition to the 50-1 (e.g., ii ...ii −1 ) dummy variables for each state was also be
presented.
Statistically, change scores are not without their limitations. In the unconditional change score
model if the explanatory variables are related to the initial values of the dependent variables, a
phenomenon known as regression to the mean, biased results can occur. To correct for this, a lagged
term of imprisonment rate (unchanged, e.g. 𝑌!"!! and not ∆𝑌!"!! ) was included as a control variable.
This model is often referred to as the static-score or conditional change-score model and “frames the
analysis in the following fashion: do the independent X variables [both X or ΔX] influence changes in Y
(e.g. ∆𝑌) for fixed levels of Yt-1, that is, taking into account the negative effect of initial values of Y
(represented by 𝛽!!! 𝑌!"!! ) on subsequent change.” (Finkel, 1995: 9). In effect, this analysis can be
viewed as 50 simultaneous, first-differenced (measured though a three-year moving average), time–
series regressions that produce coefficients that represent the average effect of reforms on the average
state (Finkel, 1995; Frees, 2004). The model, ∆𝑌 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!!" … 𝛽!"# + 𝛽!!! 𝑌!"!! + 𝑖! … 𝑖!!! + ∆𝜍! +
  𝜀!" , supplied considerable advantages, yielding consistent and efficient, yet conservative, point
estimates that were both theoretically desirable and statistically robust. The full fixed effects model,
20

Because  𝑡! … 𝑡!!!   and 𝛽!   are perfectly correlated with Δ𝜍! ,  Δ𝜍! drops from the analysis
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∆𝑌 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!!" … 𝛽!"# + 𝛽!!! 𝑌!"!! + 𝑖! … 𝑖!!! + 𝑡! … 𝑡!!! +    𝜀!" , produces similar point-estimates
under an even more conservative approach that controls for unexplained unit-invariant variation by
dropping Δ𝜍! through the inclusion of 𝑡! … 𝑡!!! . This model is not without its costs as it reduces
efficiency and may introduce multicolinearity that could make the results unreliable. Fortunately the
conditional change-score model may help to limit the effects of any unit specific omitted variable bias,
reducing the necessity of the full fixed effects model.
RESULTS
Table 3 presents the results for three models testing the two competing hypotheses. The models
measured the increase or decrease in the change in the average imprisonment rate due to the move from
indeterminate sentencing (the reference group) to one or more sentencing reform, controlling for other
covariation. As noted earlier, an important consideration of this analysis is that all states during the
period after 1972 experienced imprisonment growth, regardless if they had passed a reform or not. In
fact indeterminate sentencing states, on average, increased imprisonment by about 4.5% per year (or 9.1
inmates per 100,000). Higher percent change in imprisonment, indicated by positive coefficients, (when
a reform has been implemented) indicates higher increases, on average, beyond the 4.5%. Conversely,
negative coefficients indicate that reforms resulted in a state that grew imprisonment at a rate lower than
4.5% (e.g. 4.5% - 𝛽!"# ) after the reform was implemented. While it is theoretically possible for a reform
to reduce overall imprisonment (stock imprisonment rates), only when a combination of reforms results
in more than a 4.5% reduction in year-to-year change will it actually reduce stock imprisonment.
Model 1 analyzes only the six reforms and the 11 controls, treating each reform as a discrete
independent effect. The results of this model should be interpreted with some care, as in the vast
majority of cases, a state did not enact just a single reform and interactions between the reforms are
likely present. The results do indicate some interesting findings. First, as independent effects, only one
of the front-end reforms-statutory presumptive sentencing and one of the back-end reforms, truth in
sentencing-was significant. Both grew imprisonment more than indeterminate sentencing, though the
22

effect sizes differed sizably. For example, on average, when statutory presumptive sentencing is at full
effect (ln(2.71828) or 1) the average year-to-year change in imprisonment was about 7.7%21, while in
indeterminate states it was about 4.5%, approximately a three-quarter increase in inmates per year.
Conversely, in truth-in-sentencing states, the change in imprisonment was about 5.7% or growing about
three-quarters the percent of statutory presumptive sentencing. Truth-in-sentencing percentage of
growth was still twenty-five percent more, per year, than indeterminate sentencing. Interestingly,
sentencing guideline (both presumptive and voluntary), were the only reforms (in both models), as a
main effect, to suggest lower growth in imprisonment, although the effect was not significant.

Table 3 About Here
Because most states adopted more than one reform, interaction effects are likely. Model 2 added
first-level interaction terms to the reform variables found in Model 1. Keeping with convention, nonsignificant interaction coefficients were left in the models because significant interactions were expected
(Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). In this model, on their own as main effects, statutory presumptive sentencing
(8.8%) and truth in sentencing (7.3%) continued to significantly increase changes in imprisonment rates.
The coefficients suggest, when these two reforms are fully implemented, they increased in imprisonment
by a factor of 1.96 and 1.62 per year, respectively, over indeterminate sentencing. While not significant
when modeled without interaction terms (Model 1), determinate sentencing and three strikes, as a main
effects, significantly increased imprisonment when modeled with interactions (Model 2). The finding
that three strikes was significant is curious considering previous research suggested little actual effect of
this reform. It is possible the significant impact of three strikes was related to the high coexistence of it
with other reforms. Only four of the 24 three-strike states implemented this single reform. In the other
21 states, at least one other reform (in most cases more than one additional reform) was implemented. It
21
The average growth of a reform was calculated by adding the coefficient for the reform to the average effect of 4.5% from the reference
group of indeterminate sentencing. For example, 7.7% was calculated by adding 4.5% + 3.2%.
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is possible that the significant coefficient simply represents an interaction of three strikes with the other
reforms. This assertion is supported by the non-significant effect of three strikes in Model 1 and the
numerous significant interactions terms in Model 2. Finally in Model 2, as a main effect, the sentencing
guidelines variables are no longer negative. This suggests, as main effects, that all six reforms increase
imprisonment independent of each other. Of course, the impact of the main effects should be viewed
with care as in only rare occasions did a state adopt only one reform. Additionally, the presence of
multiple reforms is likely to lead to differing impacts based on the combination they appear in.
The interaction terms presented in Model 2 bring to light a number of important considerations.
First, the reforms have vastly different effects depending on the combination they are implemented in.
For example, when statutory presumptive sentencing is paired with truth in sentencing and treated as
interacting with each other, the interaction term, serving as a mitigating effect, reduced the combined
conditional main effect. Thus, while statutory presumptive sentencing and truth in sentencing increased
sentencing 8.8% and 7.3% respectively, when both reforms are present the increase is mitigated by the
interaction term of -2.773. This “mitigating effect” resulted in an increase of only 7.9%22 suggesting the
“co-existing” reforms did not possess a purely linear additive property. This discovery furthers the
assertion that the interactions of reforms are an important consideration. While it should be noted that
not all interaction terms were significant, they had a profound effect. In some cases the interaction
terms increased the main effects, but in most cases the interaction terms served as a mitigating effect. In
fact, in some combinations the mitigating effect was so strong the combined reforms served to slow
growth in imprisonment over indeterminate sentencing. For example, in states with presumptive
guidelines and truth in sentencing growth was about 3.7% per year or about 20% lower growth than the
average indeterminate state. The interaction of voluntary sentencing guidelines and three strikes laws
was even more powerful and reduced growth by almost half to 2.5%.

22
7.9% = 4.5% (percent change in imprisonment under indeterminate sentencing) + 4.3% (main effect of statutory presumptive sentencing)
+ 1.8% (main effect of truth in sentencing) + -2.8% (interaction of statutory presumptive sentencing and truth in sentencing).
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To illustrate how the reforms impacted imprisonment growth quite differently when taken in
different combination, the average effect of sentencing reforms on aggregate changes in imprisonment
over time for states adopting the six reforms (singularly or in combination) is outlined in Table 4. The
scores presented are percent change in year-to-year imprisonment, using the coefficients from Model 2.
The scores are the predicted change from indeterminate sentencing (4.5%). The predicted change-scores
represent the average modification from indeterminate sentencing in year-to-year percent-change in
imprisonment rates for the average state adopting some combination of reforms. Thus positive
coefficients increase imprisonment above 4.5% per year, while negative coefficients results in slower
growth. Table 4 highlights that in the majority of the cases, reforms-singularly or in combinationincreased changes in imprisonment (though often not significantly). Though some combinations of
reforms resulted in lower changes, these cases were rarer. No combination resulted in actual reductions
in stock imprisonment, e.g. resulted in a predicted score less than 4.5% and thus reducing overall
imprisonment. While not uniform across all combinations including sentencing guidelines, only in
reform combinations where at least one of the sentencing guideline types was present was a year-to-year
change in imprisonment lower than indeterminate sentencing. This finding is also supported by negative
(though not significant) coefficients found in Model 1 and supportive of some prior research (e.g.
Marvell, 1995).
Another important observation from Table 4s illustration of the interaction of reforms was the
powerful impact of the “back-end” reforms. In general, as a state added additional back-end reforms,
imprisonment tended to grow at higher percentages. Policymakers may want to take note of this
important observation as it indicates that once a state already has a front-end reform as it adds additional
backend reforms, states, on average, send about one-quarter to a third more inmates a year to prison.
While there are a few cases where adding additional back-end reforms actually lowered the number of
inmates, this was limited to five interactions and only in the combination of presumptive sentencing
guidelines and determinate sentencing which occurred for a limited amount of time in only Minnesota
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and Oregon (both states later adopted additional reforms that then increased imprisonment again) was
the reduction significant. Of the front-end reforms statutory presumptive sentencing, which was largely
adopted in the 1970s, had a profound effect, doubling the number of inmates going to prison. While the
other two front-end reforms, both types of sentencing guidelines, had a more modest effect, the addition
of back-end reforms played similarly to all three. First, year-to-year changes in imprisonment slowed
when a state added determinate sentencing, but tended to grow more when either or both truth in
sentencing and three strikes were added, with or without determinate sentencing. This is another
important note for policymakers as this indicates that the most significant modern (statutory presumptive
sentencing was largely passed in the 70s and early 80s) contributor to imprisonment growth is truth in
sentencing and to a lessor extent three strikes laws (though the later may be a function of their
interaction with front-end reforms and not the reform itself). This is especially true when these reforms
are taken in combination with a preexisting front-end reform.
Models 2 also included the 11 crime, demographic, and political control variables23 found in
Model 1 (the coefficients in Model 1 are presented in Table 3 but were not discussed). Historical and
contemporary research had shown that high rates of violent crime increased state imprisonment (Irwin &
Austin, 1997; Mauer, 2002; Raphael, 2009; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000). Arrests for drug crimes
are also essential to understanding the effect of reforms. The war on drugs was a key component of the
law and order movement, and the criminal justice system increased criminalization and punishment for
various drug crimes, especially possession. As a result, in 2008, drug crime convictions constituted onefifth of state prison populations, a twenty-fold increase from 1980 (Crow & Gertz, 2008; Crow &
Johnson, 2008; Karnig & Mcclain, 1985). As expected, the lagged percent change in drug arrests was
significantly related to changes in imprisonment, suggesting increased arrests for drugs increased the
change in imprisonment within states. Violent crime arrests, on the other hand, were not significant.

23
In a model not presented in Table 3 that included only the reform variables and their interactions the analysis explained about 54% of the
variation. This suggests the control variables are explaining 11% of the overall variation.
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Table 4 About Here

Surprisingly only one of the demographic variables-percent black-significantly increased change
in imprisonment. Two of the political variables, Republican State House and Republican Governors
increased changes. While it is likely that the social pressure to get tough on crime cuts across political
parties, imprisonment rose more under Republicans, supporting some previous research (Davey, 1998;
Jacobs & Helms, 1996). Spelman (2009) has argued that state spending was the single most important
factor in increasing imprisonment. While his research also indicated that reforms, particularly truth in
sentencing (which increased imprisonment by 13%) increased imprisonment, state spending increased
imprisonment (by 29%) more than any other factor. The research here indicates that state revenue was
not significantly associated, possibly suggesting a different effect. Though the difference may also be
due to a slightly different measure in Spelman’s analysis. He used state spending as opposed to state
revenue, while highly correlated they are not exactly the same and might account for the difference.
Plumper and Troeger (2007) note a unit-fixed effects model alone does not correct for possible
unit-invariant omitted variable bias. To illustrate the possible impacts of any national effect that might
produce unit-invariant omitted variable bias leading to unreliable results, Model 3 adds fixed effects for
years to Model 2. The results were quite similar suggesting that Model 2 was appropriate. This was
likely given the results of the Hausman test prior to analysis.
The full-fixed effects model does indicate a relatively large increase in R-squared, from 0.486 in
Model 2 to 0.626 in Model 3. This increase may seem substantial by indicating that a fairly large
amount of unit-invariant omitted variation is present. While technically true, we must caution against
jumping to this conclusion without further exploration. First, it is important to recognize that fixedeffects, while it controls for unobserved variation caused by our ignorance to properly specify all
variation that could otherwise be measure (e.g. omitted variable bias), fixed effects only allows us to
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specify the place of our ignorance (with the important “byproduct” of controlling for omitted variable
bias). That is, it tells us if it is either time-invariant or unit-invariant, but does not tell us what
specifically is going on (it gives where, but not what). Thus, in this cause we now know that 14% of the
unexplained variation in our model is “located” in time, but for us to actually alleviate our ignorance we
would have to add additional variables. Second, and possibly a more important consideration of our
ignorance specification is if this unit-invariant omitted variable bias is leading to inconsistent pointestimates. While likely a significant problem in the traditional OLS random effects model with or
without unit fixed-effects. It is worthy mentioning again that the unit-specific fixed effects model in this
analysis is not simply a pooled OLS regression model. The results presented in Model 2 include panel
corrected standard with conditional change-scores, with the later specification likely alleviating much of
the bias causing covariation with our unspecified time-variant ignorance. As indicated by the Hausman
test the unit-specific fixed effects model is consistent suggesting that when all of the model
specifications of this analysis are incorporated time-variant omitted variable bias is not undermining
Model 2 and the discussion of Table 4.
There were some changes from Model 2 to Model 3 of note. The most notable change was in the
increased standard errors of many of the coefficients. This was likely caused by two major factors.
First, was a, albeit relatively small, reduction in the degrees of freedom by the inclusion of 40 (𝑡! … 𝑡!!! )
additional covariates. Second, and possibly more important, was a likely increase in multicolinearity.
As, Halaby (2004) details the inclusion of fixed effects for time, while it likely corrects for unit-invariant
omitted variables bias, it has a tendency to lead to variables with small unit-to-unit differences,
including in this analysis many of the reform and some of the controls variables, to be substantially
correlated with the dummy variables for time. This may best be illustrated by the increase in the
standard errors of the reform variables, as they are particularly likely to be correlated.
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DISCUSSION
This analysis has advantages over some previous research. First, the analysis included a long
time period of historically relevant data that is current to 2007. The “imprisonment binge” began
roughly in the early 1970s with 1972 often cited as the “start date” (Blumstein & Beck, 1999; DeFina &
Arvanites, 2002). With data beginning in 1967 it allowed for analysis prior to and after the start of the
binge, improving the overall model. Additionally, data for every year was included, which covered the
effects more accurately than previous studies using more limited 3, 5, or 10-year gaps (Wooldridge,
2002). Second, this analysis included six major sentencing reforms and first level interactions, a marked
advantage over some previous research that has included fewer reforms and, at times, failed to interact
them. As seen in this analysis, considerable change in the effects are observed when different
combinations of the reforms are considered and failure to account for this in previous research may have
miss-specified the true impact. Third, the analysis included both cross-sectional and time-series data
giving it a marked advantage over analysis that lacked one of these dimensions. Finally, the modeling
technique employed takes a step away from previous research and supplies a unique, yet arguably better,
analysis that incorporates, among other things, conditional change-scores, fixed-effects for states, and
the logged growth curve variables for reforms.
Some researchers, however, have argued that the type of analysis in this study is undermined by
the variation in reforms from state-to-state, both in what was adopted and in functional operation. For
example, not all presumptive sentencing guidelines are the same with some having tight ranges and
some having wide ranges. This type of variation is inherent and unavoidable as rarely will two policies
enacted by different states be exactly the same. But policy-to-policy variation alone is not enough to
discount the results. While the policy variation may make the models less efficient, meaning larger
standard errors that reduce the likelihood of finding significant relationships, they do not make them less
accurate, because as long as the variables are properly specified, the point estimates are still consistent.
That being said, the analysis does not allow complete state-by-state analysis (e.g. we can not definitely
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calculate the change over time for Oregon vs. Washington) or conclude that all states or even one
particular state observed the effects. The analysis does, on the other hand, allow the conclusion that, on
the aggregate or on average, a reform is (or is not) significantly associated with changes in
imprisonment within states. The coefficients represent the average treatment effect across states which
does have important substantive interpretation, outlining the average change over time within states
(Finkel, 1995).
Additionally, while it might seem logical to advocate for more delineation among the six
reforms, such a move is not without its statistical costs. Disaggregating the variables into smaller and
smaller groups reduces the statistical power of “pooling” data over time, which is one of the main
advantages of TSCS modeling. The ability to get significant results would succumb to an increased
“slicing” of the data. This highlights the delicate balance of variable specification and statistical power
that is often weighed in these types of models (Wooldridge, 2000). The specifications of the reform
variables in this analysis were made in an attempt to maximize statistical power while maintaining
meaningful outcomes.
The statistical modeling is one of the areas where this study differs from the three previous
studies with the most similarities (e.g. Spelman, 2009; Stemen, et al., 2006; Zhang, et al., 2009) and may
account for the dissimilarities found. The use of conditional change-scores, measured as percent
change, was a notable component of this analysis. As Spelman (2008) and Frost (2008) highlighted, the
choice of measurements can have a profound impact and change-scores more accurately specify year-toyear changes in imprisonment. Previous studies have tended to use trending imprisonment rates,
overlooking the need to address this specification error. Additionally, Spelman (2008) and Halaby
(2004) suggested that many previous studies, including some studies of imprisonment, have chosen to
include random effects models and unchanged or stock imprisonment data. These previous studies have
often failed to account for issues of omitted bias, unit-roots, and serial correlated errors, which can all
lead to substantially biased point estimates. This study took a different approach, incorporating
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methodological advantages that may better represent the true nexus of the reform effects on
imprisonment. In the end, the model “sacrificed” efficiency, which can lead to more significant results,
to “protect” the integrity (consistency) of the coefficients against biased point estimates. This more
“conservative” approach likely produced more reliable and valid results.
CONCLUSION
The central finding of this investigation is that some “fixed” sentencing reforms significantly
impacted changes in imprisonment rates over time, indicating they led to larger aggregate changes under
some conditions, while reducing them under other conditions. While Boerner and Lieb (2001) make
note of a few states that had not seen specific direct prison growth, this analysis suggests otherwise. In
general, as highlighted in Table 4 (though not always significantly supported), the presence of statutory
presumptive sentencing, truth in sentencing, or three strikes, though not without exception, tended to
increase the change in imprisonment. Though it should be noted that impact of three strikes was
relatively small, while generally growing more than indeterminate sentencing, the growth rate was lower
for combinations of reforms with three strikes than without. For example, while the main effect of three
strikes significantly increased imprisonment when this reform is taken in combination with other
reforms, it generally did not result in additionally higher changes. In isolation, statutory presumptive
sentencing resulted in an 8.8% yearly increase in imprisonment, but when three strikes was present the
yearly change was actually slightly less at 8.2%. In only four of the 24 states were only three strikes
adopted, which stresses the need to consider the impact of interactions between reforms. Overall, the
analysis suggested a weak general effect of three strikes laws.
The tendency of statutory presumptive sentencing, truth in sentencing, or three strikes to increase
imprisonment more was observed in most cases, except when sentencing guidelines was present. While
in both models the main effects of sentencing guidelines failed to be significant, there were occasions
where their interactions were significant. Additionally, in Model 2 and 3 the main effects of sentencing
guidelines were positive (though not significant), but when taken in combination with other reforms,
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they tended to reduce imprisonment growth over indeterminate sentencing. It is important to note that
with exception of one state, Arkansas, the passage of sentencing guidelines was always accompanied by
an additional back-end reform. The profound effect the interactions had in this case may explain the
negative coefficients in Model 1. The findings related to sentencing guidelines represent the only place
in the analysis that supports the normative theory of reforms that suggested reforms would create
opportunities to limit prison growth. In this sense, the findings are not inconsistent with Marvell’s
(1995) earlier finding that presumptive sentencing guidelines reduced imprisonment in six of nine states
he studied.
The findings suggest that reforms, generally outside of sentencing guidelines, increased
imprisonment more than indeterminate sentencing. The findings were not completely unexpected. For
example, while Spelman (2009) concluded that state revenues were chief among factors leading to
prison growth, he did show that reforms were related, particularly truth in sentencing laws. Thus in a
sense, the analysis here supports his findings on this one front, especially considering the possibility that
reforms were among many factors that led to prison growth, and in some cases, this may have been even
counter to the reforms intended outcome. On the other hand, the findings here do not support his
contention that state resources were driving imprisonment growth.
Another important impact of Spelman’s (2009) findings was the relative speed by which truth in
sentencing was adopted after the passage of the Omnibus Crime Bill. Spelman (2009) suggests that the
bill resulted in more resources for the states and this translated into higher imprisonment. While his
resource contention is plausible, it also highlights the need to consider federal resources and federal
imprisonment when assessing state imprisonment. While states have seen significant prison growth,
federal growth has been even higher in recent years, rising over 80% between 1995 and 2005 (U.S.,
1965-2008b). Half of all inmates in federal prison are incarcerated due to drug crimes (Hebert, 1997),
and it is possible that these federal changes had a trickle-down effect on state imprisonment. Future
research may want to consider these important federal influences.
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Overall, while in some combinations the reforms suggest a reduction in prison growth,
supporting the normative theory of reforms, the analysis was more consistent with the neoclassical
theories that suggests the context of the law and order movement combined with the increased
objectivity of the shift to a more formal-rational system of sentencing increased imprisonment more in
reform states. This analysis, with the preponderance of evidence on the side of the neoclassical
argument, is at odds with some previous research. Stemen et al. (2006) and Zhang et al. (2009) found
that in some combinations, determinate sentencing actually reduced imprisonment. The findings here
give some very limited support for this contention, but otherwise the findings, including the results that
suggest statutory presumptive sentencing and truth in sentencing increased imprisonment, run counter.
Again, the differences may, in part, be driven by the methodological differences between these previous
studies and this one. For example, when the models in this analysis are run without fixed-effects for
states a number of the reforms-including presumptive sentencing guidelines (a finding of Marvell’s
(1995) study) and determinate sentencing-significantly reduced changes in imprisonment, though as
argued, the exclusion of fixed-effects for states would be in error. Additionally, the models included
logged growth curve variables to represent reforms, a relatively new measure. Previous research has, to
date, generally included dummy variables, which may misrepresent the “growth like” effects
discussed.24
States generally began the reform movement on the front-end then moved to back-end. Sixtynine percent of states passed a front-end reform before the 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill, while 70 percent
of back-end reforms were passed after the bill. In general, as a state added additional back-end reforms,
when they already possessed a front-in reform or another back-end reform, they increased imprisonment
changes more, suggesting a “piling-on effect”. Alaska and Rhode Island were the only states of the 29
to pass a front-end reform not to add at least one back-end reform, with most passing at least two. The
piling-on is highlighted nicely by the interactions of the back-end reforms in Table 4 where two-reform
24
When the models were ran with dummy variables (results not shown) the analysis was similar, but not identical, with some differences in
the size of the coefficients.
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states had higher growth than one-reform states, and three-reform states had higher growth than two
reform states. Policy-makers may want to acutely consider this finding as these back-end reforms may
have counteracted slower prison growth imbedded in a front-end reform. The curtailing of these backend reforms may help slow growth and give states a chance to control spiraling costs. This may be
particularly relevant for determinate sentencing where parole boards could help control prison growth.
Their elimination may have hastened the growth of other reforms. The costs of locking criminals up is
increasingly expensive and “prison beds” are currently at critical levels in a number of states (Jacobs &
Carmichael, 2001; Shane-DuBow, 1998). The overall costs of imprisonment growth to individual states
can be high. While variation from state to state exists, the average cost per inmate across all states in
2003 was $22,650 indicating rising imprisonment is costly (Boerner & Lieb, 2001). The costs are even
higher when capital costs of more jails and prisons are added to the equation. Additionally, increased
imprisonment places resource pressures on public defenders and the courts. Rapid increases in prison
populations can be devastating to a system that is often slow to respond (Kruttschnitt, 2005).
The results presented here have useful policy and theoretical implications. In all cases, with the
exception of some cases where sentencing guidelines were enacted (though even in some cases where
they were enacted), the analysis points to a support of the general theoretical arguments that the law and
order movement of the mid 1970s to today was, in part, driving a shift to the “justice model” of
imprisonment that included “fixed” sentencing (Scheingold, 1991). The reforms served to change the
process, through the bureaucratization of the system as described by Weber (1978) and others, from a
system giving significant leeway to judges and in house prison officials to a system largely placing
power into hands of elected political officials (e.g. legislators and prosecutors) ultimately creating a
system that is more susceptible to political and social pressures (Savelsberg, 1992). The theory suggests
that under these conditions an increase in punitive incarceration could be expected in which “fixed”
sentencing represents a way to codify the punitiveness. These increases are likely regardless of the
stated political purposes or goals of the reforms (e.g., desire to be growth-neutral). An important area
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for future research is to assess the key state-level contexts and social structures that are likely to
influence the adoption and implementation of reforms. The current project suggests general theoretical
arguments for possible mechanisms at work, but more direct assessment is needed.
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Table 1. Distribution of Sentencing Types Across the United States as of 2008
Presum.
Stat.
Truth in
Three
Guide.
Vol Guide.
Presum.
Deter. Sent.
Sent.
Strikes
Alabama
2006
Alaska
1980
Arizona
1978
1994
1994
Arkansas
1994
1995
California
1976
1976
1994
1994
Colorado
1979
79-85
1994
Connecticut
81-90
1995
1994
Delaware
1987
1990
1990
Florida
1994
1983-93
1983
1995
1995
Georgia
1995
1995
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
1978
Indiana
1977
1977
1994
Iowa
1996
Kansas
1993
1993
1994
Kentucky
Louisiana
1987
1994
Maine
1976
1995
Maryland
1983
1994
Massachusetts
Michigan
1999
1984-98
1994
Minnesota
1980
1982
1993
Mississippi
1995
1995
Missouri
1997
1994
Montana
1995
Nebraska
Nevada
1995
New Hampshire
New Jersey
1977
1995
New Mexico
1977
1977
1994
New York
1995
North Carolina
1995
1981
1994
1994
North Dakota
1995
1995
Ohio
1996
1996
1996
Oklahoma
Oregon
1989
1989
1995
Pennsylvania
1982
1991
1995
Rhode Is.
1981
South Carolina
1995
South Dakota
1996
Tennessee
1989
1995
1995
Texas
Utah
1985
1985
1995
Vermont
1995
Virginia
1995
1995
1995
1994
Washington
1984
1984
1984
1993
West Virginia
Wisconsin
85-94 & 99
1999
1994
Wyoming
Total
10
11
8
18
24
24
Note: Table 1 represents the current sentencing type used by each state as of 2008. Presum. Guide. stands for presumptive sentencing
guidelines. Vol. guide. Stands for voluntary sentencing guidelines. Stat. Presum. stands for statutory presumptive sentencing. Deter. Sent.
stands for determinate sentencing. Truth in sent. stands for truth in sentencing. Three strikes refers to three strikes laws. All other states
utilize indeterminate sentencing.
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Table 2. The Six Reforms Included in Analysis
Reform
Presumptive Sentencing
Guidelines1

Description
Consists of a matrix of possible sentences with a more
narrow range within a sentencing category that is
defined by an offender’s criminal history (prior
offenses) and offense severity then indeterminate
sentencing. Judges generally must follow the matrix as
the sentence is enforced through appellate review.
Voluntary Sentencing
Treat guidelines as formal recommendation, but does
Guidelines1
not legally mandate they be followed by the judge.
That is, while judges generally follow them, an
offender may not appeal deviations from the matrix
Statutory Presumptive
Represent an attempt to create uniformity within
Sentencing1
similarly situated crimes, but acts less like a sentencing
rubric. It specifies an appropriate or "normal" sentence
for each offense as a baseline for a judge.
Determinate Sentencing2
Refers to a system without discretionary parole boards.
Truth in Sentencing2
Requires offenders serve a statutorily defined minimum
amount of time. Only states meeting the 1994 Federal
Omnibus Crime Bill minimum of 85% time-served of
original sentence are considered.
Three Strikes Laws3
A habitual offender law focused on three-time felony
offenders. Generally the law suggests a severe
sentence for a third felony offense.
1
Front-End Reforms 2 Back-End Reforms 3Sentencing Enhancement
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Table 3. The effects of sentencing reforms on changes in imprisonment over time: 1967-2007
Reforms

Fixed Effects:
States Only
Model 1
S.E.

Fixed Effects:
States Only
Model 2
S.E.

Fixed Effect:
States & Time
Model 3

S.E.

Pres. Sent. Guidelines

-1.055

(0.855)

1.127

(1.508)

1.512

(1.591)

Voluntary Sent. Guidelines

-0.312

(0.473)

0.361

(0.492)

0.475

(1.203)

Statutory Presumptive Sent.

3.241***

(0.990)

4.336*

(2.165)

2.373**

(0.907)

Determinate Sentencing

0.578

(1.021)

1.926*

(0.811)

1.593

(1.159)

Truth in Sentencing.

1.190*

(0.496)

1.838**

(0.679)

1.764*

(0.813)

Three Strikes

0.688

(0.441)

1.467*

(0.602)

0.629

(0.441)

Interaction Terms
Pres. Guide * Determ. Sent.

-

-

-5.033***

(1.245)

-4.210*

(1.724)

Pres. Guide * Truth in Sent.

-

-

-3.171

(2.154)

-4.819*

(2.459)

Pres. Guide * Three Strikes

-

-

2.368

(2.084)

2.265

(3.050)

Vol. Guide * Determ. Sent.

-

-

-3.135***

(0.788)

-1.489

(1.436)

Vol. Guide * Truth in Sent.

-

-

-0.837*

(0.470)

-1.141*

(0.585)

Vol. Guide * Three Strikes

-

-

-1.975*

(0.791)

-1.357**

(0.589)

Stat. Pres. * Determ. Sent.

-

-

-5.256*

(2.607)

-2.373*

(1.181)

Stat. Pres. * Truth in Sent.

-

-

-2.773*

(1.411)

-2.873*

(1.453)

Stat. Pres. * Three Strikes

-

-

-2.112***

(0.617)

-2.320***

(0.740)

Det. Sent. * Truth in Sent.

-

-

1.776**

(0.551)

2.170*

(1.117)

Det. Sent. * Three Strikes

-

-

0.347

(1.609)

0.497

(1.979)

Truth * Three Strikes

-

-

0.290*

(0.151)

0.279

(0.217)

Crime Controls
Violent Crime (Lagged)

-0.0167

(0.019)

-0.0186

(0.019)

-.00155

(0.003)

Drug Crime (Lagged)

0.00209***

(0.001)

0.00221***

(0.001)

-.00199*

(0.0009)

Percent Black

0.124

(0.111)

0.412***

(0.121)

0.052

(0.049)

Percent Hispanic

-0.132

(0.087)

-0.0129

(0.075)

0.072

(0.080)

Percent Unemployment

-0.198

(0.130)

-0.186

(0.127)

0.077

(0.108)

Percent Poor

0.0035

(0.074)

0.012

(0.070)

0.0071

(0.014)

Percent Urban

-0.0051

(0.013)

-0.0029

(0.013)

-0.002

(0.004)

Rep. St. House (Lagged)

0.569***

(0.119)

0.552***

(0.131)

0.516***

(0.186)

Rep. St. Senate (Lagged)

0.106

(0.132)

0.0601

(0.136)

0.139

(0.178)

Rep. Governor (Lagged)

0.828**

(0.297)

0.667*

(0.311)

0.558*

(0.271)

State Revenues (Lagged)
Lagged Dependent Variable
Observations
R-Squared

0.193
-0.0177***
2024
0.435

(0.180)
(0.003)

0.103
-0.0185***
2024
0.486

(0.187)
(0.003)

0.280
-0.0338***
2024
0.626

(0.156)
(0.003)

Demographic Controls

Political Controls

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Truth in Sent., Determinate
Sent., and Three Strikes

Determinate Sentencing &
Three Strikes

Truth in Sentencing

-1.98*

-0.21

4.97

-1.54

2.80

2.21

2.94*

Presumptive Sent. Guide.	
  

(1.51)

(1.02)

(0.17)

(3.43)

(1.24)

(1.62)

(1.38)

(1.56)

0.37

-0.85

1.37

-0.15

1.93*

1.16**

-1.01

2.06*

(0.49)

(1.28)

(1.69)

(0.80)

(1.09)

(0.56)

(0.82)

(1.16)

4.34*

1.01***

3.41^

3.70

1.85*

3.05

0.71*

1.84^

(2.17)

(0.20)

(1.96)

(3.21)

(0.99)

(2.66)

(0.34)

(1.19)

Voluntary Sent. Guide.
Statutory Presump. Sent.

Truth in Sentencing &
Three Strikes

	
  
	
  1.13

Three Strikes

	
  
	
  

Determinate Sentencing

Determinate Sentencing &
Truth in Sentencing

Table 4. Estimated Aggregate Percent Change Over Time of Reforms by Themselves or in Combination
with Other Reforms.

Determinate Sentencing

1.93*

5.55^

3.75

7.65

(3.01)

(2.76)

(5.82)

Truth in Sentencing

(0.81)
1.84*

5.55^

3.60

(3.01)
3.75

(4.15)

Three Strikes

(0.68)
1.47*

3.60

7.65

(0.60)

(2.76)

(4.15)

(5.82)

4.5051

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

Indeterminate Sentencing

	
  	
  

7.65
(5.82)

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

Notes: The coefficients represent the average (of the aggregate state) change over time in imprisonment rate per 100,000 state
populations controlling for the variables presented in Model 2 of Table 3. 1 Indeterminate sentencing was calculated by
setting each of the reform variables to zero. Italicized reforms indicate reforms or combinations in which change in
sentencing was lower than indeterminate sentencing. Standard error in parentheses and were calculated using STATA’s
lincom command. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10

47

